After the Moroccan Sahara file experienced significant developments in defining the parameters of a solution, manifested in the implementation of the Autonomy Initiative, and following the recognition of the Western Sahara's Moroccanness by several major powers and their support for autonomy, De Mistura, Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General, chose a completely different path far removed from the solution. He conducted consultations with countries hostile to Morocco that support the separatist Polisario Front movement.
This path taken by De Mistura complicated his mission and deviated it from the direction of a political solution endorsed by permanent members of the Security Council and other concerned nations such as the United States, Germany, Spain, and France. Negotiations were supposed to focus on implementing autonomy as a UN plan to end the conflict. Unfortunately, the UN Envoy continued to present informational briefings on events without providing realistic and practical political solutions. The nature of Mr. De Mistura's briefings remains ordinary, routine procedures legally structured according to Security Council sessions, which he now outlines in a report dealing with the status and progress of the negotiations he sponsors, updates on the implementation of Resolution 2703, and his assessment of MINURSO's tasks and the difficulties the mission faces due to the Polisario Front's behavior, which violates the ceasefire agreement every day.
Similarly, Alexander Ivanko, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of MINURSO, delivered his briefing summarizing the latest developments on the ground related to the UN mission's mandate. He detailed the obstacles and challenges facing the mission from the Polisario Front in performing its task of monitoring the 1991 ceasefire agreement signed under UN supervision. Consequently, this mission report has become more significant than De Mistura's report. It appears that the UN Envoy found himself facing a reality that far exceeded him, having been unable to resume negotiations since their suspension in 2019. The remaining question is: after the final, practical, and realistic resolution of the Moroccan Sahara issue, what solutions are left for the UN to offer?
Hassan Abyaba, former minister and university professor